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The European Union in Sudan: A Missed
Opportunity?
GORDON D. CUMMING
Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
ABSTRACT International organisations active in Africa are often criticised for their ineffectiveness.
So too is the European Union (EU), which is also accused of failing to assume a more prominent
conﬂict management role in war-torn countries. This article examines the EU’s capacity and
readiness to take on such a role in one such country, the former Republic of Sudan, home to Africa’s
longest-running civil wars and the ﬁrst ‘genocide’ of the 21st century. It begins by outlining the
EU’s record in Darfur and the North–South Peace Process. Drawing upon 25 interviews and Hill’s
‘capabilities–expectations model’, it then questions whether the EU’s ‘capabilities’ (resources,
instruments, unity) were ‘ﬁt for purpose’ in Sudan’s hostile target setting. It concludes by identifying
settings that have been more propitious for a conﬂict-related management function and by
suggesting that the EU should better manage expectations about future security roles.
KEY WORDS: conﬂict, Commonwealth, Darfur, European Union, mediation, Sudan, United
Kingdom, United Nations, North–South Peace Process, Sudan Liberation Army, Justice and
Equality Movement
Introduction
International organisations operating in Africa are often subject to criticism. The
Commonwealth and United Nations (UN), for example, are regularly accused of being
ineffective, indecisive and even irrelevant (Knight, 2000; Watkins, 2014). While the
European Union (EU) is also criticised on these grounds, it is perhaps more commonly
belittled for ‘punching below its weight’ (Thomas, 2012) and failing to assume a more
high-proﬁle conﬂict management role in war-torn countries (Williams and Bellamy,
2005; Olsen, 2009).1
This article examines the EU’s capacity and readiness to act as a conﬂict manager in
one such country, the former Republic of Sudan (1956–2011), home to Africa’s long-
est-running civil wars (1955–72, 1983–2005) and to the ﬁrst ‘genocide’ of the 21st cen-
tury, in Sudan’s western province, Darfur. It asks whether the EU missed chances to
take on a prominent conﬂict-related role in Sudan or whether, with its nascent common
security and defence policy (CSDP) and faced with a hostile Sudanese context, the EU
was simply not in a strong enough position to assume such a function.
This question is at the heart of this research, which is signiﬁcant in two main ways.
First, it provides a fresh perspective on what Christopher Hill (1993, 1998) has called
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the ‘capabilities–expectations gap’ by viewing this through the prism of contexts or
‘target settings’, taken here to refer to the empirical reality on the ground. Second, it
sheds new light on the way that the EU dealt with major challenges facing Sudan over
an extended period. In so doing, it makes a meaningful contribution to the existing
literature, which has tended to focus more narrowly on the EU’s response to the Darfur
Crisis: its role in supporting the African Union (AU) mission in Sudan’s western
province (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2005), its policy on conﬂict mediation
(Middleton et al., 2011) and its failure to intervene militarily in Darfur (Williams and
Bellamy, 2005; Toje, 2008; Gya, 2010).
To answer the above research question, this article makes use of Hill’s (1993, 1998)
‘capabilities–expectations model’, which identiﬁes the future functions that the EU as a
foreign policy actor might be expected to fulﬁl, and examines its capabilities (in the
form of resources, instruments and unity) to meet these expectations. It sets out the
EU’s record in Sudan from the time of the Darfur Crisis in 2003 through to the North–
South Peace Process culminating in the 2011 referendum, with brief consideration also
being given to subsequent developments in the states that emerged from that referen-
dum: Sudan and South Sudan. Drawing upon 25 interviews in Khartoum, London, Paris
and Brussels, it then explains this record in terms of the ‘ﬁtness for purpose’ of the
EU’s capabilities for Sudan’s hostile target setting. It concludes by identifying settings
that have been more propitious for a conﬂict-related management function and by sug-
gesting that the EU should better manage expectations about future security roles.
Research Focus and Methodology
Before proceeding, it is worth sharpening the research focus. First, the emphasis here is
primarily on the EU and its institutions rather than on individual European member
states. While it is hard to disentangle the two, the role of the latter will be largely con-
ﬁned to our analysis of ‘unity’ within the EU. Second, the main focus is on two key
aspects of the Sudanese case, namely the Darfur Crisis as from 2003 and the North–
South Peace Process as from the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) in 2005. Space constraints do not allow for discussion of the whole gamut of
Sudanese disputes over the last decade and a half, whether in the East, the ‘Three
Areas’ (Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei), or indeed between different
ethnic factions in the new state of South Sudan (ICG, 2015).
Third, this article does not assume that the EU should necessarily be ‘raising its ﬂag’
(Hazelzet, 2006, p. 569), enhancing its ‘actorness’,2 or strengthening its ‘presence’.
Indeed, there may be good reasons for the EU not to raise its proﬁle (taken here to
equate to ‘image’ or ‘standing’), particularly if that helps ‘get the job done’ (Hazelzet,
2006, p. 569) or if it creates space for ‘coordinated bilateral diplomatic efforts by EU
member states’ (Vines, 2010, p. 1,091).
Finally, my intention is not to develop a new theory or even an alternative to Hill’s
model, which has survived, relatively unscathed, in the fast-moving world of interna-
tional relations.3 Instead, my aim is to apply the model in a more nuanced way by
viewing the EU’s ‘capabilities’ through the prism of speciﬁc ‘target settings’ and by
giving greater consideration to ways in which the EU manages ‘expectations’. On the
ﬁrst point, there will clearly need to be some discussion of the wider context, or what
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Bretherton and Vogel (2006) term ‘the opportunity structure’. However, the real
emphasis here will be on the target setting, that is, the reality on the ground, and the
way that these ‘local’ political, geographical and strategic factors affect the EU’s ‘ﬁtness
for purpose’ for particular challenges.
On the second point, regarding expectations, word limits do not allow for consideration
of whether Hill’s (1993, pp. 312–315) predictions about future EU roles have held true.
Such an analysis would no doubt reveal that the EU nowadays is not a ‘superpower’ (a
position reserved for the US and increasingly China), a ‘global intervenor’ (as its limited
inﬂuence in the Israeli–Palestinian dispute demonstrates), or indeed a ‘mediator of con-
ﬂicts’ (as shown by its inability to secure a place on the Mbeki Panel, discussed later).
The EU has arguably fared better as a ‘bridge between rich and poor’ (the EU is the
world’s largest donor), ‘regional paciﬁer’ (the EU has played an important role in stabilis-
ing the Balkans) and ‘joint supervisor of the world economy’ (the EU is a major player in
World Trade Organisation) (Toje, 2008, pp. 138–139). Whatever the ﬁndings of future
research on this topic, the key point to emphasise here is that expectations regarding the
EU’s role as a conﬂict manager have remained high, particularly among the public, in
most European countries (interview with European Institute of Security Studies, January
2012). This is perhaps not surprising considering some of the statements issued by the
EU. A case in point was the 2003 European Security Strategy (‘A Secure Europe in a Bet-
ter World’), which stressed the ‘need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid
and when necessary, robust intervention’. Nor is it particularly remarkable given that a
‘strong focus on ... conﬂict management is ... exactly in line with crucial values and ideas
that contribute to the EU’s identity’ and is consistent with its ‘goal of turning the Union
into a signiﬁcant international actor’ (Olsen, 2007, p. 12).
The EU’s Record in Sudan
The European Community (EC)/EU had little chance to play a visible role in Sudan
over the early post-colonial era. Before even achieving independence in 1956, this for-
mer Anglo-Egyptian condominium had lapsed into the ﬁrst of two protracted civil wars.
The EU’s proﬁle in Sudan was further reduced when, in March 1990, it suspended
development assistance, expressing concern about the recent military coup and human
rights violations. This suspension put EU–Sudanese relations formally on hold for over
a decade, even if the EU did manage to channel €450 million in humanitarian
assistance between 1992 and 2002 (European Commission, 2005, p. 14).
It was not, however, until November 1999 that relations began to thaw. In recogni-
tion of progress made by the Sudanese government and the Sudanese Popular Libera-
tion Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA: John Garang’s southern political group) towards a
peace agreement, the EU began a formal political dialogue with the regime in
Khartoum. By January 2002, following progress in these talks, the EU had launched
the Humanitarian Plus programme providing monies for rehabilitation-related activities.
Darfur Crisis
It was then against this backdrop of improved EU–Sudanese relations that ﬁghting
erupted in March 2003 in the Darfur region between government forces and rebels from
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the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). On
the face of it, the Darfur Crisis presented the EU with a real opportunity to go beyond
dialogue and establish itself in a conﬂict management capacity. In this context, Williams
and Bellamy (2005) have contended that the EU was one of the few actors that could
have intervened militarily, while Toje (2008, p. 135) has claimed that ‘With the UN
deadlocked, and having declared the European Security and Defence policy (ESDP)
operational just one month’ earlier, the EU was ‘always the most likely candidate to
carry out such a mission’, not least since Darfur was ‘exactly the sort of question that
the ESDP was created to handle’, as it fell ‘within the narrow conﬁnes of where the
EU states have agreed that the use of force can be necessary’.
By mid-2004 there were indeed signs that a military option was being considered by
the EU, whose top military ofﬁcial, Gustav Hagglund, afﬁrmed that this was ‘very
possible’ (Channel News Asia, 12 April 2004). In July, British Prime Minister Tony
Blair stressed that he was ‘ruling nothing out’, while UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw
revealed that Britain and its EU partners were discussing the despatch of ‘a joint EU
civilian and military team’, which might include troop deployments (The Daily Tele-
graph, 23 July 2004). In August, Blair suggested the UK had a ‘moral responsibility’
to help and placed 5,000 troops on standby (Williams, 2006, p. 172). The following
month saw US Secretary of State Colin Powell opening the door to military interven-
tion—though not by the US—by labelling the killings in Darfur ‘genocide’. By Decem-
ber, however, the number UK troops on standby had fallen to 3,000 (Agence France
Presse, 26 December 2004) and by June 2005 the UK government was emphasising
that it had ‘no plans to send UK troops to Darfur’ (Williams, 2006, p. 172). The UK’s
backtracking reﬂected its concerns over British military overstretch, NATO’s reluctance
to become involved other than in a support capacity (BBC, 2005), the opposition by
Russia and China to any intervention without a ﬁrm UN mandate, the concern of smal-
ler EU member states to ﬁnd alternative options, and France’s unwillingness to ‘shoul-
der a signiﬁcant part of the burden’ or to ‘support coercive measures’ (Toje, 2008,
p. 137).
Thereafter the EU, while not abandoning its quest for visibility, fell into a supporting
role. One aspect of this involved backing non-EU civilian–military missions. In this con-
text, the EU became the main funder of AMIS, an AU observer mission deployed in June
2004 to monitor compliance with the N’Djamena ceaseﬁre agreed two months earlier.
Recognising the mission’s lack of capacity to operate in such a hostile region, the EU
helped to transform AMIS into AMIS II in October, thereby allowing the enhancement of
the African force with more troops, including a civilian police component. But the short-
comings of AMIS II soon became equally apparent, and the EU joined other northern
donors in pressing Khartoum to accept a successor mission, UNAMID. Authorised by
the UN Security Council (UNSC) in July 2007, UNAMID was a hybrid force involving
the AU and UN and designed to include 19,000 troops and 3,700 civilian personnel
(Reuters, 13 June 2007). Three EU member states—Britain, France and Sweden—con-
tributed a small number of military personnel, while several others provided civilian
police ofﬁcers (Gya, 2010, pp. 12–13).
Another feature of the EU’s supporting role was sanctions. Thus, the EU backed
UNSC resolutions (1,556 in 2004 and 1,591 in 2005), which placed arms embargoes on
non-state actors operating in Darfur. In 2005, it also imposed autonomous sanctions
on the Sudanese government (Sicurelli, 2010, p. 67). These included restrictions on
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admission and freezing the funds of targeted individuals. Thereafter, the EU was a key
supporter of the indictments, issued in March 2009 and July 2010, by the International
Criminal Court (ICC) against Sudan’s sitting head of state, President Omar al-Bashir. It
called upon the Sudanese government to respect this ruling and publicly criticised states
refusing to arrest Bashir on their soil.
A ﬁnal dimension of the EU’s back-up function involved conﬂict mediation. Here, the
EU sought to carve out a role for itself by assigning a special envoy, Sten Rylander, to
assist with peace negotiations on Darfur. In July 2005, it raised its proﬁle by appointing
an EU Special Representative (EUSR), Pekko Haavisto, to ‘achieve a political settlement
in Darfur’ (Middleton et al., 2011, p. 19). Haavisto was then ‘heavily involved in mediat-
ing’ what was a ‘rushed and badly organized process’ (Middleton et al., 2011, p. 21) that
led to the failed 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja. The next EUSR, Torben Brylle,
played a lower key role, sitting in on the joint AU–UN mediation talks in Doha from
2007 (Middleton et al., 2011). The EUSR from 2010–13, Dame Rosalind Marsden, also
engaged in the Doha talks and, as one of the E6 (envoys from the EU, UK, US, France,
Russia, China, who ﬁrst met in May 2009), played a part in ensuring that Doha was not
eclipsed by Darfuri mediation processes and that it brought about the signature of the
Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in July 2011 (interview with Nordic ofﬁcial, Brus-
sels, June 2013). To this day, however, ﬁghting has continued in Darfur, with Darfuri
rebels now forming, together with northern-based SPLA units, a broad anti-Khartoum
coalition known as the Sudan Revolutionary Front (ICG, 2015, p. 1).
The North–South Peace Process
Turning to the North–South Peace Process, this was of course going on at the same
time as the Darfur Crisis, even if donors generally sought to keep the issues separate
and often prioritised the former (interview with French ofﬁcial, Khartoum, May 2010).
The peace negotiations made headway in the early 2000s with the signing of protocols
(on wealth-sharing, power-sharing, security and the Three Areas), which, taken together,
constituted the CPA. The CPA was a six-year roadmap for peace, granting the South a
degree of autonomy, promising elections and a referendum on secession, and establish-
ing a UN mission (UNMIS) to monitor the ceaseﬁre. The agreement was signed in Nai-
vasha in January 2005 by Sudan’s government and the SPLM, as part of a regional
(Intergovernmental Authority for Development or IGAD-led) process, reinforced by
international observers. Yet while the EU had not sent a special envoy to the negotia-
tions, it was invited to ‘guarantee’ the CPA and sit on the Assessment and Evaluation
Commission (AEC), which monitored the implementation of the CPA.4 The EU’s
invitation to the top table did not, however, imply that it was being taken seriously by
other AEC members (the US, Norway, UK, Holland and Italy). Rather, as one Nordic
ofﬁcial explained: ‘It was accepted that it was more useful to have the EU round the
table in an observer role because of its large donor commitment and its coordinating
function, more on the donor than the political side’ (interview in Brussels, June 2013).
Rather than force its way into the foreground, the EU dutifully implemented the
terms of an agreement that had been crafted by other, more inﬂuential players. Thus, in
2005, the European Commission produced a Country Strategy Paper, offering a compre-
hensive €400 million development assistance package aimed at supporting stability,
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education, food security, peace-building, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration
operations (European Commission, 2005, p. 3).
While the EU continued in this back-seat role over the next ﬁve years, it nonetheless
had opportunities to raise its proﬁle, notably at the time of the April 2010 elections, the
January 2011 referendum and in the early post-referendum period. In the case of the
elections, the EU provided technical and logistical support, co-chaired (with Holland
and the UK) the UN Development Programme-managed election basket-fund, and con-
tributed €12.5 million to it (Middleton et al., 2011, p. 21). The EU also impressed on
the Sudanese government the importance of ‘an open political space’ (interview with
EUSR, Brussels, November 2011), as well as sending a huge election observer mission.
As regards the referendum on the secession of South Sudan, here too the EU played a
visible role. It contributed €3.25 million to the UN Development Programme referen-
dum basket-fund (Middleton et al., 2011, p. 21). It also deployed long-term observers
in Sudan from November 2010 as well as a large observer mission in January 2011.
In the wake of the referendum, which resulted, six months later, in the inauguration
of Africa’s 54th state, South Sudan, the EU had a unique opportunity to raise its proﬁle
as a conﬂict manager and mediator. Against a backdrop of continuing North–Sudan dis-
putes and growing violence in Abyei, South Kordofan and the Blue Niles States (ICG,
2015), the EU adopted a ‘Comprehensive Approach’, which was supposed to allow it
to mobilise all the instruments at its disposal in support of ‘peace, justice and
democratisation’ (personal communication, European External Action Service (EEAS),
November 2011). In line with this approach, the EU launched, in June 2012, an
18-month CSDP civilian mission (EUAVSEC) to bolster airport security in Juba, South
Sudan. It did, however, have to shelve other potential operations—a medium-term bor-
der policing mission and a longer-term patrol of the Nile (Bloch, 2011)—following the
outbreak of civil war in South Sudan in December 2013.
The EU was also beset by problems in its attempts to establish its credentials as a
conﬂict mediator. Believing that Thabo Mbeki had privileged access both to President
Bashir and to South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir (Zwan, 2011, p. 18), the EU invested
heavily in the (Mbeki-led) AU High-level Implementation Panel, which was charged
with resolving outstanding CPA and post-CPA issues. It provided the bulk of the fund-
ing and even offered three technical experts. However, two of these experts were subse-
quently declined (on nationality grounds), as was a request from the EU High
Representative Baroness Catherine Ashton that the EUSR should participate in the work
of the panel (Middleton et al., 2011, p. 20).5
Faced with these setbacks, the EU has, unsurprisingly, sought to foreground its
developmental rather than conﬂict management role, particularly in South Sudan. It
transformed its sub-ofﬁce into a full embassy in Juba in May 2011 and, in June, began
a joint programming process, whereby the EU coordinates the bilateral aid efforts of its
member states. However, the EU’s actions have been constrained by two recent
developments. The ﬁrst was South Sudan’s refusal to sign the Cotonou Agreement—
Europe’s aid and trade convention with former African, Caribbean and Paciﬁc colonies
—for fear of SPLM ﬁgures being indicted by the ICC (Olsen and Furness, 2014,
p. 10). The second was the outbreak, in December 2013, of large-scale ﬁghting between
President Kiir’s Dinka community and Vice-President Riek Machar’s Nuer supporters.
The EU delegation has now largely suspended its long-term development programmes
and gone back to concentrating on humanitarian assistance (Olsen and Furness, 2014).
478 G. D. Cumming
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ard
iff
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
5:5
5 1
6 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
EU Capabilities: ‘Fitness for Purpose’
It follows that the EU did not carve out a high-proﬁle conﬂict management role either
in Darfur or during the North–South Peace Process. In part, this can be explained by a
lack of political will but in part it is also linked to the ‘ﬁtness for purpose’ of the EU’s
‘capabilities’ (resources, instruments and unity) for raising its proﬁle in this target
setting.
Resources
The EU has had vast resources to spend on Sudan. Indeed, ‘EC aid to the Sudan
jumped by ... 1000 per cent from 2001 to 2005’ (Olsen, 2007, p. 13). With the signing
of the CPA in 2005, the EU promised a €400 million development assistance package
and continued providing €100 million annually in humanitarian assistance (personal
communication, EEAS, November 2011). The EU maintained ﬂows of development
assistance even after the Bashir government refused, in July 2009, to ratify the Cotonou
Agreement, potentially turning its back on €336 million pledged under the 10th Euro-
pean Development Fund (EDF) (Olsen, 2007, p. 13). Signiﬁcantly too, the EU remained
the second largest donor to the Multi Donor Trust Fund-South Sudan, while European
member states continued to pay more than 40% of the costs of UNMIS and UNAMID
(Zwan, 2011, p. 19).
The above ‘soft power’ resources were enough to secure the EU a place at most top
tables. But they afforded only limited leverage in a target setting such as Sudan, where
oil revenues were high (Patey, 2007) and where the regime in Khartoum had no interest
in resolving humanitarian crises, even going so far as to expel, in March 2009, 16 relief
agencies operating in Darfur (IRIN, 2009).
As regards ‘human resources’, EU staff operating in Sudan displayed ‘a bit of
inexperience on the political side’ (interview with European ofﬁcial, Khartoum, May
2010). They were more comfortable dealing with technical development issues than
strategic questions and, when the European Commission was charged with chairing the
N’Djamena ceaseﬁre monitoring commission, they had to rely entirely on member
states for military advice (ICG, 2005, p. 10).
The same cannot be said of the EUSRs, who were much more politically astute.
However, these envoys did not all attach the same importance to raising the EU’s pro-
ﬁle. The ﬁrst EUSR was ‘the politically proactive and independent Haavisto [who]
failed to acknowledge the limits of his mandate’ (Ferhatović, n.d., p. 7). He was suc-
ceeded in 2007 by Danish diplomat Torben Brylle, ‘who respected the limitations set
by leading member states’, but was widely regarded as an observer and who never actu-
ally met the Sudanese president (interview with Whitehall insider, June 2013). The next
EUSR, Marsden, was highly respected, even if her appointment in August 2010 was
problematic in the eyes of some European ambassadors in Khartoum given that she had
just been UK High Commissioner (interviews, May 2010). In the end, all these EUSRs
were hampered by the fact that their advisors were seconded for short periods by
member states, were thought to ‘remain loyal to the seconding structures that pay their
salaries’ (Ferhatović, 2009, p. 51) and were not in post long enough to move beyond a
‘reactive approach to conﬂict management’ (Zwan, 2011, p. 22).
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Instruments
Turning to instruments, here the EU has also had a vast array of tools with which to
assume a more prominent conﬂict-related role. To begin with CSDP military missions,
these are arguably the EU’s most conspicuous instrument, offering the immediate pro-
spect of enhanced visibility. However, as noted earlier, the EU failed to launch an
operation in Darfur, and the explanation for this lies at least partly in the target setting
in Sudan, where a brutal regime, backed by China and Russia, was resisting any
international military engagement. By contrast, the EU’s subsequent success in under-
taking a civilian CSDP mission (EUAVSEC, 2012) in Juba can also be understood in
terms of changes in the target setting: South Sudan was a new state, which desperately
needed to boost its trade, regionally and internationally, and whose leaders had long
been pushing for an operation of this kind (interview with EUSR advisor, January
2012).
The EU’s other conﬂict management tools were more low-key, often serving to
support other actors. To illustrate, the EU contributed €3 million, via its Instrument for
Stability (IFS), to the trust fund that ﬁnances the AU–UN-led peace process in Darfur
(House of Lords, 2011, p. 42).6 Similarly, the EU made contributions to the AMIS and
UNAMID missions. While these were more sizeable (some €440 million between 2004
and 2007 and over 100 military personnel (conﬁdential personal communication, EEAS,
November 2011)), they did not raise the EU’s proﬁle in Sudan for several reasons. First,
AMIS was under-resourced and had no established mediation capacity (ICG, 2005).
Second, it was ﬁnanced by the Africa Peace Facility (APF), which is itself funded by
the EDF and hence precludes expenditure on military equipment. Finally, in the case of
UNAMID, the EU was only allowed to supply a tiny number of military personnel and
was subsequently required by the Sudanese government to withdraw all of them
(interview with defence attaché, Khartoum, May 2010).
Another measure that could have marked the EU out as a serious player was sanc-
tions. However, in practice, the EU hid behind the UN on arms embargoes and adopted
economic sanctions that were ‘less restrictive than those imposed by the US’ (Sicurelli,
2010, pp. 49, 67). The EU’s reticence was largely the result of a lack of political will
but also reﬂected a recognition that sanctions were unlikely to sway an oil-rich
Sudanese regime and might even afford other players greater inﬂuence at a point in the
peace process when the EU had to remain engaged (interview with former EUSR
advisor, Brussels, January 2012). The precedent for this had already been set in the
1990s when ‘Western’ sanctions had allowed China, Malaysia and India to become the
dominant investors in Sudan’s oil sector (Patey, 2007, p. 5).
The same reticence did not mark the EU’s approach to the ICC’s 2009 indictment as
it soon became the donor that was most systematic in refusing to meet Bashir. How-
ever, the ICC was a double-edged sword. As one EUSR advisor made clear: ‘The EU
is perceived as a strong actor by sticking to its principles. But this ties our hands politi-
cally. We can’t engage with Bashir. The AU is also very “anti” the ICC Resolution.
Paradoxically, every time Bashir travels to another country, our inﬂuence diminishes’
(interview in Brussels, November 2011). In practice, this self-denying ordinance meant
that the EU was excluded from high-level negotiations with the president and had to
ﬁnd other interlocutors. According to one EEAS ofﬁcial (interview in Brussels, 2012),
‘these could be Heads of State within the region’ or ‘the circle around the president’
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who ‘then pass on messages’. The ultimate irony of the EU’s principled stand is that
the continuing threat of arrest by the ICC is now the main obstacle to Bashir stepping
down and opening the door to meaningful national dialogue (Conﬁdential communica-
tion, London, July 2015).
Other EU instruments have included missions to observe the elections and referen-
dums. While these were high-proﬁle, their ﬁndings were never going to be allowed to
derail the North-South peace process. They also exposed the EU to criticism. The EU
was accused of ‘losing momentum in the period building up to the referendum’ (inter-
view with Nordic ofﬁcial, June 2013) and, before the elections themselves, of arriving
too late for the original census, by which time much rigging had already been done.
According to one election advisor (interview in Khartoum, May 2010):
The Carter Center had been on the ground with four teams since February 2008.
We were pushing the EU to have its observers on the ground in time for voter
registration starting on 1 November. Brussels is non-functional in summer. If you
want to be a major player here, you can’t take the summer off.
Finally, another soft power instrument was EU declarations. These were arguably the
EU’s preferred approach but had no obvious impact on the Khartoum regime. On leav-
ing ofﬁce, the Finnish EUSR Haavisto commented on the futility of the EU expressing,
for the 54th time, ‘verbal concern’ about the situation on the ground in Darfur (EU
Observer, 1 May 2007).
Unity
Turning to the question of unity, the following analysis will argue that, while there were
disagreements between European member states that reduced the EU’s prospects of
assuming a more prominent EU conﬂict management role, there was also a ‘basic
underlying unity’ (interview with American diplomat, Khartoum, May 2010) that
enabled the EU to play a low-key but vital supporting function.
The clearest example of disunity was over the possible CSDP military mission to
Darfur. This is not surprising given that this is where the EU is most dependent on
member states for military contributions and ‘political direction’ (Gya, 2010, p. 12).
Crucially, the EU3 (Germany, the UK and France), whose agreement is usually required
to launch an operation, were not united (Toje, 2008, p. 135). Germany, which is never
an enthusiastic supporter of such missions (interview with French Foreign Ministry,
November 2011), was seeking alternatives. The UK favoured a NATO lead, while
France opposed this (Sicurelli, 2010, p. 61). The fact that Britain and France were sup-
posed to be cooperating more closely in line with the 1998 St Malo II Agreement was
ignored by the UK, which jealously guarded its status as part of the Troika (Norway,
US, UK), the most inﬂuential northern players in Sudan.
Other disagreements were much less in the public spotlight. There were, for example,
divergences over the EU’s support for AMIS, with some member states pushing for
APF funds to be used to ﬁnance this mission, while others saw this as a ‘“slippery
slope”, with development funds being increasingly called upon to fund military work’
(Olsen, 2007, p. 10).
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Equally, there were differences over the ICC indictment. While this was supported
rhetorically across the EU, whose members had all signed the Rome Statute on which
the ICC was founded, member states had different interpretations of what was meant by
‘essential contact’. The Dutch took the toughest line, with their ambassador even
absenting himself from Bashir’s swearing-in ceremony in 2010, while the UK adopted
a more relaxed stance: the British High Commissioner paid her respects when leaving
ofﬁce (interviews with Whitehall insider, June 2013). As a rule, AEC member states
were keenest to leave channels open to Bashir. As one of their ofﬁcials explained: ‘If
you want to push implementation of the CPA, you need to leave [a] door open to the
different parties—SPLM and [the government’s] National Congress Party’ (interview,
Khartoum, May 2010).
Other disputes were kept even further out of public view. These included disagree-
ments over who should pay the cost of transporting ballot papers from Khartoum to
Juba, then on to polling stations. Some member states argued that this was the responsi-
bility of Sudan’s electoral commission but AEC members pushed the EU to make these
payments, which they eventually did (interviews, Khartoum, May 2010). More signiﬁ-
cantly, there were ‘different sensibilities’ on how rigorously the EU should judge the
2010 electoral process, with ‘the Dutch at the hard end, the UK much softer and the
EU somewhere in the middle’ (interview with Whitehall insider, June 2013). According
to one European ofﬁcial (interview in Khartoum, May 2010), ‘Nobody in the EU dis-
puted the criticisms by the observer mission. But ultimately the election was needed for
the CPA. In the end, we all signed up to … semi-credible, D-minus elections’.
Finally, there were even differences over EU declarations. According to one European
ofﬁcial (interview in Khartoum, May 2010), ‘Some countries such as Sweden and Romania
were pushing for declarations’ as a way for them ‘to be visible’. Others, such as the UK,
preferred to ‘go it alone on a declaration unless it [was] a very controversial thing’. They
would ‘then ask for the cover of the EU and… share the blame with others’.
The above analysis certainly suggests disunity, with ‘bilateral donors all feel[ing] that
they need to be seen or heard’, ‘all wanting to claim success’ and some preferring ‘a
bilateral approach to the North–South dialogue and Darfur’ rather than ‘stronger coor-
dination by the EUSR’ (Zwan, 2011, p. 24). Ultimately, however, many of the differ-
ences should not be overstated as they were less about interests (discussed later) than
divergent norms (House of Lords, 2011, p. 116). These included differences over the
order of priority in which different Sudanese challenges should be tackled. According
to one Whitehall insider (interview, June 2013), there was a ‘division between the EU,
whose focus was on Darfur especially under Brylle, and growing concern in London
and Holland about the North–South process and drift on the CPA’. As the same inter-
viewee made clear: ‘The issue was not so much a lack of consensus since everyone
was broadly agreed on the need for peace, democratic transition and fair and free elec-
tions. But there were different perspectives on norms and pace and who got the credit
for state-building’. This point was reinforced by an American diplomat (interview in
Khartoum, May 2010), who noted that EU positions displayed ‘a lot of crucial common
ground’: on the priority attached to CPA, the need to move towards democracy, and the
importance of the referendum. This underlying unity was linked to a fear of doing any-
thing that might derail the peace process. In this sense, Sudan’s hostile target setting
appears actually to have facilitated difﬁcult compromises and made it easier for the EU
to assume a low-key supporting role.
482 G. D. Cumming
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ard
iff
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
5:5
5 1
6 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
Target Setting
The above analysis has shown how, despite having a range of resources, an array of
instruments and a degree of unity, the EU has been unable to carve out a high-proﬁle
conﬂict management role. The explanation for this lies at least partly in the target set-
ting in Sudan. In other words, it may be questioned whether the Sudanese context was
ever really propitious for a CSDP military mission. Was it the kind of place that the EU
might have been expected to emerge as a power broker or might the EU have done
better to reframe expectations?
Before homing in on this setting, it is worth remembering that EU–Sudanese relations
were playing out in a wider context or ‘opportunity structure’ (Bretheron and Vogel,
2006). This external environment was clearly important in establishing the tone of these
relations and, as such, some of its key features are outlined below. At the risk of over-
simplifying, the early 2000s can be said to have offered a favourable climate for a more
prominent EU conﬂict management role. In December 2001, the EU had declared its
rapid reaction force (50,000–60,000 troops available at 60 days’ notice) to be opera-
tional. In June 2003, the EU launched the ﬁrst CSDP mission in Africa and, in Decem-
ber, adopted the European Security Strategy. Equally, European leaders at this time,
notably Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac, were prepared to invest in an
interventionist strategy towards Africa. They were aided in this by support from civil
society groups across Europe, keen to ram home the lessons of the Rwandan genocide,
as well by growing acceptance of the right of states to intervene in line with the UN’s
Responsibility to Protect doctrine (Williams and Bellamy, 2005).
By the end of the North–South Peace Process, the EU was institutionally better
equipped to take on a conﬂict management role. It had ratiﬁed the 2007 Lisbon Treaty,
established the EEAS in 2010, introduced two EU–Africa strategies (2005, 2007) plus
speciﬁc strategies for the Sahel and Horn (2011), as well as issuing a joint communica-
tion on the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ in 2013 (European Commission/High Repre-
sentative, 2013). At the same time, however, the EU was in the grip of a major global
recession, its leaders were wary of CSDP military missions—having been press-ganged
by France into European Force (EUFOR) Chad in 2008—and the UK’s Conservative
Prime Minister David Cameron was even mooting the possibility of a UK exit from the
EU. In addition, Africa had been ‘bumped down the agenda by the Arab Spring’ and
the AU was, in line with the mantra ‘African solutions to African problems’, pressing
harder to take the lead on missions and negotiations across Africa (interview with for-
mer EUSR advisor, November 2011, Brussels).
While the international climate may have become less favourable over time, it was
not a block on CSDP military missions across much of Africa, as will be seen in the
conclusion. So what was it about the target setting in Sudan that curbed the EU’s
capacity to project itself as a major player in the conﬂict ﬁeld, particularly in the period
from the 2003 Darfur Crisis to the end of the peace process in 2011? The ﬁrst factor
was the brutality of the Khartoum regime, its unresponsiveness to soft power and its
vehement resistance to hard power. In this context, one former EUSR advisor stressed
that: ‘To do a CSDP mission [in Darfur] without the consent of the government of
Sudan was impossible. We needed their consent. We needed a UN Security Council
Resolution. The Sudanese regime was blocking our efforts to intervene’ (interview in
Brussels, January 2012). Another EUSR advisor claimed: ‘We were not allowed a logic
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of European engagement by Khartoum. Was it really a missed opportunity?’ (Interview
in Brussels, January 2012.)
The second element was the hostility of the physical terrain and the scale of the
challenge. Sudan was, until 2011, Africa’s largest country, and its Darfur region was
the size of France but with no major surfaced road network and dirt tracks that were at
the mercy of the summer rains. Furthermore, Sudan was home to multiple signiﬁcant
conﬂicts, most notably in the East and the Three Areas, not to mention many localised
disputes over pasture rights and access to water, that could trigger large-scale conﬂicts
(Zwan, 2011, p. 23). Importantly too, Sudan was a strategic hotspot surrounded by nine
neighbouring countries, all of which stood to be affected adversely by any breakdown
in the Sudanese peace process. In such a setting, it is hard to see how the EU, which
had ‘only started getting involved in “crisis management” operations in 1999’ (Gya,
2010, p. 10), could have assumed a power broker role or sustained the kind of open-
ended interventions that were needed in Darfur and other Sudanese conﬂict zones. Its
chances of doing so would doubtless have been increased by the availability of NATO
assets and planning facilities, but NATO’s engagement in Sudan would, of course, have
been anathema to the Bashir regime.
The third feature was the ‘crowdedness’ of the political space. Sudan was described
by one European ambassador as ‘a competitive environment’, with a large number of
external players pursuing different interests (interview in Khartoum, May 2010). As
noted earlier, these actors included emerging powers, such as China and Russia, whose
interests centred on oil and arms, respectively (Patey, 2007). The US, with equities
across the region, was also heavily involved, as was Norway, with its oil interests. The
AU, which ‘always wants to run everything’ (interview in Khartoum, May 2010), and
IGAD were two of the key regional players. The EU arrived late on this scene, even if
the UK, the former colonial power with major equities in East Africa and Egypt, as
well as Holland and Italy had all been heavily involved in the Naivasha talks. This
meant there was competition between individual EU member states and between these
states and the EU. According to Middleton et al. (2011, p. 24):
The UK has been the pre-eminent EU member state voice on Sudan and along
with the Netherlands has rather crowded out the EU. In a situation where foreign
players have tended to adopt areas of specialty (oil for Norway, security for the
UK, the Three Areas for the Netherlands) the EU’s generalist approach without the
hard political clout of the US has led to it ﬁnding itself on the sidelines.
This crowding out was sometimes justiﬁed on the grounds that it helped channel sup-
port to a country which received ‘a lot of supply driven assistance’ (interview with
American diplomat, May 2010). It was also deemed necessary to ensure that the CPA
ran its course. Such a competitive approach was, however, harder to defend in post-
referendum South Sudan. Yet it continued, as can be seen from the divisions over the
EU’s adoption of joint programming in Sudan. This approach, which seeks to har-
monise the development policies of European member states and minimise the strain on
local Sudanese capacity, has been resisted by some EU states, which see it as ‘an add-
on to their bilateral engagement rather than as an overarching coordination mechanism,
and even as a chance to get EU money to support bilateral programmes’ (Olsen and
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Furness, 2014, p. 8). The UK has been the worst culprit and has, together with the
Netherlands, published a detailed country strategy that barely mentions the EU (Olsen
and Furness, 2014, pp. 8, 10).
Conclusion: Looking Beyond the Sudanese Case
This article began by noting that international organisations active in Africa frequently
face criticism. The EU is no exception and is often accused of missing opportunities to
assert itself as a conﬂict manager. This study asked whether these claims were borne
out by the EU’s record in Sudan from the time of the Darfur Crisis through to the
transition to a two-state solution. It found that there was indeed a lack of political will
and quite high levels of disagreement among member states that militated against a
more prominent conﬂict-related role. At the same time, however, it questioned whether
the EU had really missed chances to undertake CSDP military missions or emerge as a
power broker. It suggested that, while the EU did have a range of resources, an array of
instruments and a reasonable degree of unity on fundamental issues, it was always
going to struggle to translate these ‘capabilities’ into actual ‘muscle’ in a target setting
as hostile as Sudan.
The above conclusions are not intended to absolve the EU of responsibility for not
trying harder to surmount the obstacles it faced in Sudan. They do, however, help to
relativise criticisms of the EU as well as opening out on to wider questions on settings
and expectation management. The ﬁrst question concerns the inﬂuence of target settings
on the EU’s readiness to take on conﬂict management roles, speciﬁcally CSDP military
missions. Several features of these settings affect the prospects of such an intervention
taking place. The attitude of an African regime is clearly important. Where the host
government has requested support (as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
in 2003 and 2006), it is easier for the EU both to muster member state contributions
and to secure UNSC authorisation. Where, however, the regime is opposed, this is more
problematic, as the case of Libya in 2011 demonstrated, even if the EU did eventually
offer military support for humanitarian operations (EUFOR Libya, 2011).
Proximity should, in theory, increase the likelihood of an EU mission, as the EU’s
interests are often geographically ‘closer to home’. This was certainly true of the EU’s
Operation Atalanta (as from 2008) off the Somali coast. However, proximity can mean
the presence of other important actors, who may be wary of interventions (e.g. China
and Russia in Libya and Sudan). Urgency, too, should increase the likelihood of a
CSDP mission. This was indeed the case in the DRC where Operation Artemis in 2003
halted the killings in eastern Congo. However, this is often not enough, as evidenced
by the EU’s initial paralysis over Libya in 2011 and the delays in launching its 2013
mission to the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA).
The scale of the challenge is another crucial element. A mission is more probable if
the issue is likely to resolve quickly, as was the case in eastern DRC (2003), the Con-
golese elections (2006) and to a lesser extent Chad (2008), where the aim was to create
the security conditions needed to hand over to a UN force. It is less likely where the chal-
lenge is more open-ended (as in Mali), deep-rooted as in Côte d’Ivoire or linked, as it is
today in Sudan and South Sudan (ICG, 2015), to a whole series of interrelated disputes.
The key factor is arguably some kind of historical or political connection, with a
potential ‘lead nation’, such as the UK or France. This linkage really takes effect where
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the mission serves wider EU economic or security interests. The Atalanta operation is a
case in point. So too is the naval intervention to intercept migrant smuggler ships from
North Africa which has just been agreed by EU foreign and defence ministers (New
York Times, 18 May 2015). Historical ties can also work where a lead nation is
prepared to invest enough energy into persuading other EU states into supplying troops.
This was how France ensured the launch of the 2013 EUFOR RCA mission, despite
the fact that the EU had virtually no wider strategic interests at stake (Olsen and
Furness, 2014, p. 15).
Turning, ﬁnally, to the issue of how best to manage expectations, this is the dimen-
sion of the Hillian model that is most neglected. There is, of course, a limit to how far
the EU can frame expectations in contexts such as Darfur where the US had, by pub-
licly recognising the ‘genocide’, encouraged speculation about a strong-armed interna-
tional response.7 However, expectation management should be easier in other African
contexts and would bring EU discourse more into line with the undeniable reality that
the EU has, over the last ﬁve years, been moving away from a hybrid approach involv-
ing military interventions and civilian missions towards one that is heavily skewed
towards capacity-building (the European Union’s Capacity Building mission or EUCAP
Sahel Niger, 2012; EUCAP NESTOR, 2012) and training (the EU’s training mission or
EUTM Mali, 2013 and EUCAP Sahel Mali, 2014).8
The EU has made an important contribution to conﬂicts across Africa by assuming
many of these low-key functions. Despite this, the EU has felt the urge to continue
fuelling unrealistic expectations as to its future conﬂict management roles. The most
recent example is the EU’s 2013 Joint Communication on its ‘comprehensive approach
to external conﬂict and crises’. This includes a promise to ‘coordinate and where possi-
ble combine the use of a full range of EU tools and instruments … to craft a ﬂexible
and effective response during and after the stabilisation phase and in case of risks of
conﬂict’ (European Commission/High Representative, 2013, p. 9, italics added).
It is easy to see why the EU is seeking a ‘whole-of-Union’ strategy that makes ‘its
external action more consistent’ (European Commission/High Representative, 2013,
pp. 2, 12). What is, however, less clear is why the EU has not sought to qualify the
‘comprehensiveness’ of this approach by laying down speciﬁc criteria—geographic,
political and logistical—that could trigger ‘CSDP missions and operations’ (European
Commission/High Representative, 2013, p. 9). By tightening up its discourse in this
way, the EU would take an important step towards bridging the capabilities–expecta-
tions gap. It would discover the beneﬁts of under-promising and over-delivering, while
also building more solid foundations on which its future aspirations as a conﬂict man-
ager could be based. Furthermore, the EU need not be alone in this process. A similar
approach could be adopted by other international organisations active in Africa, not
least the Commonwealth and the UN, each of which has its own capabilities–expecta-
tions gap and each of which has a need to restore its image in the 21st century.
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Notes
1. This article avoids the broad deﬁnition of conﬂict management employed in some EU circles which
includes conﬂict prevention and crisis management (Sicurelli, 2010) and is closer to Olsen’s (2009)
deﬁnition, which focuses on military missions, mediation and supporting instruments.
2. ‘Actorness’ refers to the EU’s ‘capacity to act’ (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998, p. 214), while ‘presence’
equates to ‘the ability to exert inﬂuence externally’ (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, pp. 24–30).
3. There have, for example, been alternative empirical approaches (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998) and
theoretically informed models focusing on preference-formation (Thomas, 2012).
4. Before the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had one chair for the European Commission and one for the presidency/
EUSR (interview with EU Delegation, Khartoum, May 2010).
5. By contrast, the US, Norway and UK have roles within this process (Power, 2015).
6. The IFS is a ﬂexible mechanism that funds short-term crisis management responses.
7. The European Parliament only labelled Sudan’s actions as ‘tantamount to genocide’ (Gya, 2010, p. 10).
8. European member states have contributed troops to MINUSAM, the UN force established in northern Mali
in April 2013. The Dutch have deployed 450 peacekeepers. Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland have
also sent troops.
References
BBC (2005) Analysis: Nato’s role in Darfur, BBC News, 29 April, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/
4498409.stm, accessed 3 March 2015.
Bloch, S. (2011) CSDP and EU mission update, European Security Review, Brieﬁng 6. Brussels: ISIS Europe,
June/July.
Bretherton, C. and Vogel, J. (2006) The European Union as Global Actor, 2nd edn. New York: Routledge.
Commission European (2005) Sudan: Country Strategy Paper 2005–2007. Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission/High Representative (2013) Joint communication: the EU’s comprehensive approach to
external conﬂict and crises, JOIN (2013) 30 ﬁnal.
Ferhatović, E. (n.d.) Implementing peace in Sudan, http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/ﬁles/arti
clepdf/Ferhatovic%20Sudan.pdf, accessed 9 May 2015.
Ferhatović, E. (2009) Implementing peace in Sudan, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 8(4), pp. 45–54.
Gya, G. (2010) The EU’s Role in the Darfur Crisis. Madrid: Fride.
Hazelzet, H. (2006) Human rights aspects of EU crisis management operations, International Peacekeeping,
13(4), pp. 564–581.
Hill, C. (1993) The capability–expectations gap, or conceptualizing Europe’s international role, Journal of
Common Market Studies, 31(3), pp. 305–328.
Hill, C. (1998) Closing the capabilities–expectations gap?, in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (Eds.), A Common
Foreign Policy for Europe? New York: Routledge, pp. 19–41.
House of Lords (2011) The EU and Sudan, HL Paper 160. London: HMSO.
ICG (2005) The EU/AU Partnership In Darfur. Brussels: ICG.
ICG (2015) Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conﬂicts. Brussels: ICG.
IRIN (2009) Sudan: NGO expulsion, http://www.irinnews.org/report/83370/sudan-ngo-expulsion-to-hit-darfur-
s-displaced, accessed 11 May 2015.
Jupille, J. and Caporaso, J.A. (1998) States, agency and rules, in C. Rhodes (Ed.), The European Union in the
World Community. Lynne Rienner: Boulder, pp. 213–229.
Knight, W. A. (2000) A Changing United Nations. London: Palgrave.
Middleton, R., Melly, P. and Vines, A. (2011) Implementing The EU Concept On Mediation. Brussels:
European Parliament.
Olsen, G. R. (2007), Between development policy and foreign policy ambitions., Paper prepared for EUSA
10th Biennial International Conference, Montreal, May.
Olsen, G. R. (2009) The EU and military conﬂict management in Africa, International Peacekeeping, 16(2),
pp. 245–60.
Olsen, G. R. and Furness, M. (2014) Europeanization and the EU’s comprehensive approach. Paper presented
to Roskilde University, 23 November.
Patey, L. A. (Ed.) (2007) Oil Development in Africa. Copenhagen: DIIS.
The European Union in Sudan 487
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ard
iff
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
5:5
5 1
6 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
Power, S. (2015) Remarks on peacekeeping, http://usun.state.gov/brieﬁng/statements/238660.htm, accessed 17
May 2015.
Sicurelli, D. (2010) The European Union’s Africa Policies. London: Ashgate.
Thomas, D. C. (2012) Still punching below its weight?, Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(3),
pp. 457–474.
Toje, A. (2008) The consensus–expectations gap: explaining Europe’s ineffective foreign policy, Security
Dialogue, 39(1), pp. 121–141.
Vines, A. (2010) Rhetoric from Brussels and reality, International Affairs, 86(5), pp. 1091–1108.
Watkins, J. (2014) Aging inﬂuence: the Commonwealth in the 21st century, Harvard International Review, 36
(1), http://hir.harvard.edu/archives/7535, accessed 21 March 2015.
Williams, P. D. (2006) Military responses to mass killing, International Peacekeeping, 13(2), pp. 168–183.
Williams, P. D. and Bellamy, A. J. (2005) The responsibility to protect, Security Dialogue, 36(1), pp. 27–47.
Zwan, J. van der (2011) Evaluating the EU’s Role and Challenges in Sudan. London: International Alert.
488 G. D. Cumming
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ard
iff
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
5:5
5 1
6 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
